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Abstract 
RSA is an asymmetric crypto algorithm which is applied widely in the information security of E-Commerce and 
Internet-Bank. Its security has been withstanding tests since several decades ago. But the key security isn’t equal to 
that of algorithm, which is often neglected by most of users and scholars. As to most constructions, they lack definite 
recognition to the safety of the RSA key. As a result, even some strong crypto-algorithms used it still meets the 
security predicament. In this paper, start with the known plaintext attack to RSA public key crypto scheme, we 
pioneer the mechanism of quantitation of the RSA key security strength, the concept of key security coefficient, the 
evaluation model of security coefficient and the algorithm to extract security strength. Further more, an innovative 
method of generating secure keys is proposed. After some experimentations, the security performance of key and 
distribution of secure key-amount, and their key security coefficient are surveyed and analyzed in detail. The 
theoretic analysis and statistics demonstrate that our mechanism could elevate  security of RSA in effect. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction
RSA is a public key algorithm which has been being applied extensively in the area of information 
security because of its concise preliminary , believable security and understandability [1].Many attack 
algorithms against RSA are reduced to the attack against IFP in mathematical essence, yet, none of which 
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presents a satisfying effect. In addition, because of either the defects or shortcomings of RSA exposed 
when it being implemented other attack means could attack effectively RSA in some especial case. For 
example, chosen cipher-text attack, public modulus attack and low encryption exponent attack, and so on. 
However, there is no universal and effective crack algorithm hitherto [2].  
The attack to RSA becomes a research hot of applied cryptograph area, and the method of known 
plaintext attack comes into the sight of scholars. For instance, u=6973, p=107, q=167, n=17869, 
plaintext=12345, if repeat the RSA encryption operation 4 times, and the plaintext is restored. “4 times” be 
equivalent to a second secret private key discovered by the third party, which makes it very easy to inform 
the hacker of the private information sent by sender.  
Is this case the result of either the RSA algorithm itself or the overlook in the generation of RSA keys ? 
Herein, we start an extensive and in-depth exploration in order to perfect RSA crypto scheme. 
2.  Analysis of Chosen Cipher-text Attack against RSA 
RSA algorithm consists of 3 steps which include key-pair extraction, block encryption and decryption. 
The mathematical proof of RSA is demonstrated in detail in [2].“Don’t factor n and calculate the u-th root 
modulus n” is a well known difficult problem, even against the background of strong computability today. 
If choose n with enough bits at length, that still is a computationally infeasible problem [3,4]. If it is proved 
to be true that any method to break RSA maybe educe an effective algorithm to factor big integer, we can 
draw a conclusion that breaking RSA and integer-factor-problem are with the same degree difficulty. 
However, it is even a unable confirmed hypothesis. In view of “ p-1 factoring method ”, p and q are subject 
to that both p-1 and q-1 should contain enough big prime factors. Conventional process is to select two big 
primes p1 and q1, subject to p=2p1+1, q=2q1+1 to be another pair primes, which named strong primes or 
secure primes . 
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By operating u with limited times modulus exponential operation ,denoted by a times, it is easy to find 
the secret exponential index r, φ[(p-1)(q-1)]-1 times are sure to succeed. Does there exist a smaller 
number thanφ[(p-1)(q-1)]-1 to succeed ? Facts demonstrate that φ[(p-1)(q-1)]-1 times only form a 
sufficient condition, not necessary. Known a cipher-text M0,M 0u ≡ M 1 mod n; M 1u = M 2 mod n, ⋯M iu =
M i+1 mod n. If Mi= M0 then find a =i, the process above can be integrated as (M 0u )i≡ M 0 mod n. 
That is to say u(i-1) = r mod (p-1)(q-1). If encrypt plaintext for some times, you will get the same 
plaintext. Such as the example referred in the foreword, u = 6973, p = 107, q = 167, n= 17869, (p-1)×(q-1)
=17596, i=a=4, u3≡15605 mod 17596. This method is much easier to attack RSA than factoring n, and 
the keys as it are insecure [5,6]. 
3. Preliminaries of Key Security Quantitating 
3.1. Definition 1 :Key Security Strength  
Given two strong primes p and q, along with an integer u subject to GCD(u,(p-1)(q-1))=1, if there 
exists the least positive integer denoted by s to hold the condition us≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1),then define s as
the key security strength of the key (u, pq).
According to the analysis mentioned above ,when selecting different prime pair of p and q, the key-
strength varies in a larger scale. For example, as to (59,83), the security strength smax is 280,and there are 
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786 keys reaching this strength, the distribution is discontinuous. In general, along with the increment of 
strength and the number of responding keys increasing [7,8]. 
3.2. Definition 2:  Collection of Secure Keys 
Given two strong primes p and q, define the collection of secure keys as the set which includes the 
keys originating from p and q and expressed as (1), f0 denotes threshold of security strength, and fmax
denotes the maximum of security strength, function keys(p, q, si) return the number of keys deprived 
from prime pair (p, q) of which security strength equal to si.
max
0
( , ) ( , , )
i
f
i
s f
s p q keys p q s
=
= ∑         （1）
3.3. Lemma 1 
Given two strong prime pair ( p , q), the security strength of its keys s is a factor of Euler function 
value of φ[(p-1)(q-1)]. For example, 8×280=2240；1232×16=19712. 
3.4. Lemma 2 
Given a security strength of some RSA key pair f1, there always exists f2 subjected to f1× f2 =fmax. For 
example, p=59,q=83, 1×280=2×140=70×4=56×5=40×7=35×8=28×10=20×14。
Due to space limitation, the mathematical proof about these two lemmas aren’t provided here, details in 
the reference [5].According the description and examples above, the secure strength of key is a factor of its 
responding Euler value of (p-1) (q-1). The keys with different secure strength and it with different amount. 
But how to choose secure keys? It is essential to give the definition of threshold of secure strength. 
3.5. Definition 3: threshold of Security Strength 
Given two strong primes p and q, divide Euler function value of φ[(p-1)(q-1)] by 2 recursively so as 
to get an odd number which denoted by f0(p, q), abbreviated by f0, defined as the threshold of secure 
strength of the keys originated from the prime pair (p, q). For example f0(59,83)=35；f0 (179,227)=77. 
Under the condition of having known the plain-text, the attacker would launch known plaintext attack 
against RSA. That is to attempt to search a. In order to defeat this motive, f0 ought to be kept as bigger as 
possible. In the case of both p and q being strong primes,. the Euler function value of φ[(p-1)(q-1)] can be 
calculated as (2). 
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Is it is possible to defeat this attack if properly to choose prime p1 and q1?  The key of anti-attack avoids 
the existence of a far smaller number s referred above than f0. However, in the precondition of p1 and q1
being strong primes, the existence of a small s hasn’t being demonstrated yet mathematically. In the most 
construction of security system or security middle–ware, this issue is neglected in the module to implement 
RSA algorithm, which buries an indiscoverable bomb for the security of information [9,10]. 
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4. Experimentation And Statistics Analysis 
In the course of experiment, most operation of the testing security strength is modulus exponential, 
which requires a high cost of time and space. For the goal of bettering running speed, much 
implementation introduces some improving steps. For example, taking a share and fixed public key 
exponential u on encrypting, and while decrypting, saving the key parameters p and q, by Chinese 
Remainder Theorem reducing a big modulus into a small one, but not being computing the modulus 
exponential of a big integer, all of which speeds the crypto computations greatly. 
Experimentation is operated on the computation platform of a high performance cluster, named Deep-
Comp 1800, which computes the security strength of a  512-bits RSA keys. Data about it are as follows. 
The private key strong prime p (Decimal digits：60, bits：197) ：
179435497717087474860077696993008041829964087493290639987747.
The private key strong prime q (Decimal digits：95,  bits：316)：
9412673662781427654185694022234780421605604645911731110692104015822517301378788911
6432788449223.
The public key modulus n (Decimal digits 155, bits：514):  
3377935567059412524048493188510367239287374798743680071508353210273927311234643567
3197116904515578222884876485331404384775310539687299524405833722343328909.
Φ[(p-1)(q-1)] (Decimal digits：155, bits：513)：
1688967783529706262024246594255183619643687399371840035754148367115975311334359226
5777891408844871790056485259520091312721691082261863452404327626846335168.
The maximum odd factors of φ[(p-1)(q-1)] f0 ( Decimal digits：153, bits：507): 
2639012161765166034412885303523724405693261561518500055865856823618711423959936291
52779553263201121719632582180001426761276423160341616443817619169473987.
Aim at p ,q, the running time details shown as Table 1(no speeding) and table 2 (speeded by CRT). 
However, it makes it a condition that the prime factors decomposition expression ofφ(p-1)(q-1) is 
extracted. Obviously GCD(2k,f)=1,let m1=2k,m2=f; then M= m1×m2, let M1=M/m1；M2=M/m2；extract yi 
subjected to yi ×Mi≡ 1 mod mi；compute ai= modexp(u,f,mi)；x ≡ a1M1y1+a2M2y2 mod M. According to 
CRT, x = modexp(u, f,(p-1)(q-1)),that is the result. 
TABLE 1. REGULAR RUNNING TIME  
Bits Decrypt (ms) Encrypt (ms) 
256 16 1 
512 16 2 
1024 94 31 
ms: Millisecond 
TABLE 2. RUNNING TIME  BY CRT ACCELERATION
Bits Decrypt (ms) Encrypt (ms) 
256 9 1 
512 10 2 
1024 57 31 
ms: Millisecond 
We sample the data of a strong 512-bits RSA key pair which is listed as above. And its security 
coefficients f0 is extracted at the cost 8810ms. If it is in use, it takes f0 times encryption operation, about 
10153ms≈10143 years on the computer which can execute once encryption operation per 15ms in order to 
attack it by repeat encryption. Through a process like that, the security strength quality of key is recognized 
quantitatively and clearly, and the probability of introduction of weak at random key is cut largely. 
5. Conclusion 
Customarily, people tend to relate the security of system to crypto algorithm, and most of focus on 
security is placed on algorithm. As a matter of fact, strength is a fundamental characteristic of key. As to 
strong algorithm there are chances of generating weak keys, which puts the information security in the 
danger of collapse. It is possible and necessary to quantitatively recognize the security characteristic of key 
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and to treat it as one of the candidate criterions. In the paper a practical solution against the issue in the 
discussion is initiated, which can promote the recognition to RSA and improving its security. Several 
pieces of conclusion are summarized as follows. 
1. Against the known plaintext attack to RSA public key crypto scheme, the concept of key security 
coefficient, the evaluation model of security coefficient and the algorithm to extract security coefficient are 
pioneered systematically in this paper. In addition, the security performance of key and the responding 
experimental statistics is extracted and analyzed thoroughly. 
2. Via a process as this, key security quality is recognized quantitatively and clearly, and the probability 
of introducing weak key at random is cut largely. In a word, our mechanism could improve the security of 
RSA in effect which is demonstrated by the theoretic analysis and statistics above. 
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